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Abstract. The unification of logic and probability is a long-standing concern in
AI, and more generally, in the philosophy of science. In essence, logic provides
an easy way to specify properties that must hold in every possible world, and
probability allows us to further quantify the weight and ratio of the worlds that
must satisfy a property. To that end, numerous developments have been under-
taken, culminating in proposals such as probabilistic relational models. While
this progress has been notable, a general-purpose first-order knowledge represen-
tation language to reason about probabilities and dynamics, including in contin-
uous settings, is still to emerge. In this paper, we survey recent results pertaining
to the integration of logic, probability and actions in the situation calculus, which
is arguably one of the oldest and most well-known formalisms. We then explore
reduction theorems and programming interfaces for the language. These results
are motivated in the context of cognitive robotics (as envisioned by Reiter and
his colleagues) for the sake of concreteness. Overall, the advantage of proving
results for such a general language is that it becomes possible to adapt them to
any special-purpose fragment, including but not limited to popular probabilistic
relational models.
1 Introduction
The unification of logic and probability is a long-standing concern in AI [72], and more
generally, in the philosophy of science [31]. The motivation stems from the observation
that (human and agent) knowledge is almost always incomplete. It is then not enough to
say that some formula φ is unknown. One must also know which of φ or ¬φ is the more
likely, and by how much. On the more pragmatic side, when reasoning about uncertain
propositions and statements, it is beneficial to be able to leverage the underlying rela-
tional structure. Basically, logic provides an easy way to specify properties that must
hold in every possible world, and probability allows us to further quantify the weight
and ratio of the worlds that must satisfy a property. For example, the sibling relation is
symmetric in every possible world, whereas the influence of smoking among siblings
can be considered a statistical property, perhaps only true in 80% of the worlds.
Another argument increasingly made in favor of unifying logic and probability is
that perhaps it would help us enable an apparatus analogous to Kahneman’s so-called
System 1 versus System 2 processing in human cognition [43]. That is, we want to
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interface experiential and reactive processing (assumed to be handled by some data-
driven probabilistic learning methodology) with cogitative processing (assumed to be
handled by a deliberative reasoning methodology).
To that end, numerous developments have been undertaken in AI. Closely follow-
ing Bayesian networks [70,52], and particle filters [30,35], the areas of statistical re-
lational learning and probabilistic relational modeling [28,36] emerged, and have been
very successful. Since the world is rarely static, the application of such proposals to dy-
namic worlds has also seen many successes, e.g., [68,80]. However, these closely follow
propositional representations, such as Bayesian networks, using logic purely for tem-
plating purposes (i.e., syntactic sugar in programming language parlance). So, although
the progress has been notable, a general-purpose first-order knowledge representation
language to reason about probabilities and dynamics, including in continuous settings,
is still to emerge.
In the early days of the field, approaches such as [33] provided a logical language
that allowed one to reason about the probabilities of atoms, which could be further com-
bined over logical connectives. That work has inspired numerous extensions for reason-
ing about dynamics. But this has been primarily in the propositional setting [82,40,45],
or with discrete probabilistic models [78]. (See [15] for extended discussions.) In this
paper, we survey recent results pertaining to the integration of logic, probability and
actions in the situation calculus [65,71]. The situation calculus is one of the oldest and
most well-known knowledge representation formalisms. In that regard, the results illus-
trate that we obtain perhaps the most expressive formalism for reasoning about degrees
of belief in the presence of noisy sensing and acting. For that language, we then explore
reduction theorems and programming interfaces. Of course, the advantage of proving
results for such a general language is that it becomes possible to adapt them to any
special-purpose fragment, including but not limited to popular probabilistic relational
models.
To make the discussion below concrete, we motivate one possible application of
such a language: cognitive robotics, as envisioned by Reiter [71] and further discussed
in [48]. This is clearly not the only application of a language such as the situation
calculus, which has found applications in areas such as service composition, databases,
automated planning, decision-theoretic reasoning and multi-agent systems [71,83].
2 Motivation: Cognitive Robotics
The design and control of autonomous agents, such as robots, has been a major concern
in artificial intelligence since the early days [65]. Robots can be viewed as systems that
need to act purposefully in open-ended environments, and so are required to exhibit
everyday commonsensical behavior. For the most part, however, traditional robotics
has taken a “bottom-up” approach [79] focusing on low-level sensor-effector feedback.
Perhaps the most dominant reason for this is that controllers for physical robots need to
address the noise in effectors and sensors, often characterized by continuous probabil-
ity distributions, which significantly complicates the reasoning and planning problems
faced by a robot.While the simplicity of Bayesian statistics, defined over a fixed number
of (propositional) random variables, has enabled the successful handling of probabilistic
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information in robotics modules, the flip side is that the applicability of contemporary
methods is at the mercy of the roboticist’s ingenuity. It is also unclear how precisely
commonsensical knowledge can be specified using conditional independences between
random variables while also accounting for how these dependencies further change as
the result of actions.
Cognitive robotics [48], as envisioned by Reiter and his colleagues [71], follows
closely in the footsteps of McCarthy’s seminal ideas [64]: it takes the view that under-
standing the relationships between the beliefs of the agent and the actions at its disposal
is key to a commonsensical robot that can operate purposefully in uncertain, dynamic
worlds. In particular, it considers the study of knowledge representation and reasoning
problems faced by the agent when attempting to answer questions such as [53]:
– to execute a program, what information does a robot need to have at the
outset vs. the information that it can acquire en route by perceptual means?
– what does the robot need to know about its environment vs. what need only
be known by the designer?
– when should a robot use perception to find out if something is true as op-
posed to reasoning about what it knows was true in the past?
The goal, in other words, is to develop a theory of high-level control that maps the
knowledge, ignorance, intention and desires of the agent to appropriate actions. In this
sense, cognitive robotics not only aims to connect to traditional robotics, which already
leverages probabilistic reasoning, vision and learning for stochastic control, but also
to relate to many other areas of AI, including automated planning, agent-oriented pro-
gramming, belief-desire-intention architectures, and formal epistemology.
In lieu of this agenda, many sophisticated control methodologies and formal ac-
counts have emerged, summarized in the following section. Unfortunately, despite the
richness of these proposals, one criticism leveled at much of the work in cognitive
robotics is that the theory is far removed from the kind of continuous uncertainty and
noise seen in typical robotic applications. That is, the formal machinery of GOLOG
to date does not address the complications due to noise and uncertainty in realistic
robotic applications, at least in a way that relates these complications to what the robot
believes, and how that changes over actions. The assumptions under which real-time
behavior can be expected is also left open. For example, can standard probabilistic pro-
jection methodologies, such as Kalman and particle filters, be subsumed as part of a
general logical framework?
The results discussed in this article can be viewed as a research agenda that attempts
to bridge the gap between knowledge representation advances and robotic systems. By
generalizing logic-based knowledge representation languages to reason about discrete
and continuous probability distributions in the specification of both the initial beliefs
of the agent and the noise in the sensors and effectors, the idea is to contribute to com-
monsensical and provably correct high-level controllers for agents in noisy worlds.
3 Tools of the Trade
To represent the beliefs and the actions, efforts in cognitive robotics would need to
rely on a formal language of suitable expressiveness. Reiter’s variant of the situation
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calculus has perhaps enjoyed the most success among first-order formalisms, although
related proposals offer attractive properties of their own.1 Reiter’s variant was also the
language considered in a recent survey on cognitive robotics [48], and so the reported
results can easily be put into context.2
In this section, we will briefly recap some of the main foundational results discussed
in [48]. In a few cases, we report on recent developments expanding on those results.
3.1 Language
Intuitively, the language Ł of the situation calculus [65] is a many-sorted dialect of
predicate calculus, with sorts for actions, situations and objects (for everything else,
and includes the set of reals R as a subsort). A situation represents a world history as a
sequence of actions. A set of initial situations correspond to the ways the world might
be initially. Successor situations are the result of doing actions, where the term do(a, s)
denotes the unique situation obtained on doing a in s. The term do(a¯, s), where a¯ is
the sequence [a1, . . . , an] abbreviates do(an, do(. . . , do(a1, s) . . . )). Initial situations are
defined as those without a predecessor, and we let the constant S0 denote the actual
initial situation. See [71] for a comprehensive treatment.
The picture that emerges from the above is a set of trees, each rooted at an initial
situation and whose edges are actions. In general, we want the values of predicates and
functions to vary from situation to situation. For this purpose, Ł includes fluents whose
last argument is always a situation.
Following [71], dynamic domains in Ł are modeled by means of a basic action
theory D, which consists domain-independent foundational axioms, and a domain-
dependent first-order initial theoryD0 (standing for what is true initially), and domain-
dependent precondition and effect axioms, the latter taking the form of so-called suc-
cessor state axioms that incorporates a monotonic solution to the frame problem [71].
To represent knowledge, and how that changes, one appeals to the possible-worlds
approach [34]. The idea is that there many different ways the world can be, where each
world stands for a complete state of affairs. Some of these are considered possible by a
putative agent, and they determinewhat the agent knows and does not know. Essentially,
situations can be viewed as possible worlds [74]: a special binary fluent K, taking two
situation arguments determines the accessibility relation between worlds. So, K(s′, s)
says that when the agent is at s, he considers s′ possible. Knowledge, then, is simply
truth at accessible worlds: Knows(φ, s)  ∀s′. K(s′, s) ⊃ φ[s′].
Sensing axioms additionally capture the discovery of the truth values of fluents. For
example, to check whether f is true at s, we would use: SF(sensetrue f , s) ≡ f (s) = 1. A
successor state axiom formalizes the incorporation of these sensed values in the agent’s
1 For example, the fluent calculus [77] offers an intuitive and simple state update mechanism
in a first-order setting, and extensions of propositional dynamic logic [41] offer decidable
formalisms.
2 There has been considerable debate on why a quantified relational language is crucial for
knowledge representation and commonsense reasoning; see references in [57,26], for exam-
ple. Moreover, owing to the generality of the underlying language, decidable variants can be
developed (e.g., [38,20]).
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mental state: K(s′, do(a, s)) ≡ ∃s′′[K(s′′, s)∧s′ = do(a, s′′) ∧Poss(a, s′′) ∧(SF(a, s′′) ≡
SF(a, s))]. This says that if s′′ is the predecessor of s′, such that s′′ was considered
possible at s, then s′ would be considered possible from do(a, s) contingent on sensing
outcomes.
3.2 Reasoning Problems
A fundamental problem underlying almost all applications involving basic action theo-
ries is projection. Given a sequence of actions a1 through an, denoted a¯ = [a1, . . . , an],
we are often interested in asking whether φ holds after these via entailment: D |=
φ[do(a¯, S0)]? One of the main results by Reiter is the existence of a reduction oper-
ator called regression that eliminates the actions: D |= φ[do(a¯, S0) iffDuna ∪ D0 |=
R[φ[do(a¯, S0)]. Here,Duna is an axiom that declares that all named actions are unique,
and R[φ[do(a¯, S0)] mentions only a single situation term, S0.
In the worst case, regressed formulas are exponentially long in the length of the ac-
tion sequence [71], and so it has been argued that for long-lived agents like robots, con-
tinually updating the current view of the state of the world, is perhaps better suited. Lin
and Reiter [60] proposed a theory of progression that satisfies:D |= φ[do(a¯, S0) iffDuna∪
P(D0, a¯) |= φ[S0]. Here P(D0, a¯) is the updated initial theory that denotes the state of
the world on doing a¯. In general, progression requires second-order logic, but many spe-
cial cases that are definable in first-order logic have since been identified (e.g., [61]).
3.3 Closed vs Open Worlds
D0 is assumed to be any set of first-order formulas, but then computing its entailments,
regardless of whether we appeal to regression or progression, would be undecidable.
Thus, restricting the theory to be equivalent to a relational database is one possible
tractable fragment, but this makes the closed world assumption which is not really desir-
able for robotics. A second possibility is to assume that at the time of query evaluation,
the agent has complete knowledge about the predicates mentioned in the query. This
leads to a notion of local completeness [27]. A third possibility is to provide some con-
trol over the computational power of the evaluation scheme, leading to a form of limited
reasoning. First-order fragments such as proper and proper+ [56,47], which correspond
to an infinite set of ground literals and clauses respectively, have been shown to work
well with projection schemes for restricted classes of action theories [62,61].
An altogether different and more general strategy for reasoning about incomplete
knowledge is to utilize the epistemic situation calculus. A regression theorem was al-
ready proved in early work [74], and a progression theorem has been considered in [63].
However, since propositional reasoning in epistemic logic is already intractable [34], re-
sults such as the representation theorem [57] that shows how epistemic operators can be
eliminated under epistemic closure (i.e., knowing what one knows as well as what one
does not know) needs to be leveraged at least. Alternatively, one could perhaps appeal
to limited reasoning in the epistemic setting [46].
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3.4 High-Level Control
To program agents whose actions are interpreted over a basic action theory, high-level
programming languages such as GOLOG emerged [54]. These languages contained the
usual programming features like sequence, conditional, iteration, recursive procedures,
and concurrency but the key difference was that the primitive instruction was an ac-
tion from a basic action theory. The execution of the program was then understood as
D |= Do(δ, S0, do(a¯, S0)) where δ is a GOLOG program, and on starting from S0, the
program successfully terminates in do(a¯, S0). So, from S0, executing the program leads
to performing actions a¯.
As argued in [48], GOLOG programs can range from a fully deterministic instruc-
tion a1; . . . ; an to a general search while ¬φ do πa. a: the former instructs the agent
to perform action a1, then a2, and so on until an in sequence, and the latter instructs
to try every possible action (sequence) until the goal is satisfied. It is between these
two extremes where GOLOG is most powerful: it enables a partial specification of pro-
grams that can perform guided search for sub-goals in the presence of other loopy or
conditional plans.
To guide search in the presence of nondeterminism, rewards can be stipulated on
situations leading to a decision-theoretic machinery [17]. Alternatively, if the nonde-
terminism is a result of not knowing the true state of the world, sensing actions can
be incorporated during program execution, leading to an online semantics for GOLOG
execution [73].
4 Tools Revisited
In this section, we revisit the results from the previous section and discuss how these
have been generalized to account for realistic, continuous, models of noise.
Perhaps the most general formalism for dealing with degrees of belief in formulas,
and in particular, with how degrees of belief should evolve in the presence of noisy
sensing and acting is the account proposed by Bacchus, Halpern, and Levesque [1],
henceforth BHL. Among its many properties, the BHL model shows precisely how be-
liefs can be made less certain by acting with noisy effectors, but made more certain
by sensing (even when the sensors themselves are noisy). Not only is it embedded in
the rich theory of the situation calculus, including the use of Reiter’s successor state
axioms, it is also a stochastic extension to the categorical epistemic situation calculus.
The main advantage of a logical account like BHL is that it allows a specification of
belief that can be partial or incomplete, in keeping with whatever information is avail-
able about the application domain. It does not require specifying a prior distribution
over some random variables from which posterior distributions are then calculated, as
in Kalman filters, for example [79]. Nor does it require specifying the conditional in-
dependences among random variables and how these dependencies change as the result
of actions, as in the temporal extensions to Bayesian networks [70]. In the BHL model,
some logical constraints are imposed on the initial state of belief. These constraints
may be compatible with one or very many initial distributions and sets of independence
assumptions. (See [15] for extensive discussions.) All the properties of belief will then
follow at a corresponding level of specificity.
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4.1 Language
The BHL model makes use of two distinguished binary fluents p and l [9]. The p flu-
ent determines a probability distribution on situations, by associating situations with
weights. More precisely, the term p(s′, s) denotes the relative weight accorded to sit-
uation s′ when the agent happens to be in situation s. Of course, p can be seen as a
companion to K. As one would for K, the properties of p in initial states, which vary
from domain to domain, are specified with axioms as part of D0. The term l(a, s) is
intended to denote the likelihood of action a in situation s to capture noisy sensors
and effectors. For example, think of a sonar aimed at the wall, which gives a reading
for the true value of a fluent f that corresponds to the distance between the robot and
the wall. Supposing the sonar’s readings are subject to additive Gaussian noise. If now
a reading of z were observed on the sonar, intuitively, those situations where f = z
should be considered more probable than those where f , z. Then we would have:
l(sense f (z), s) = u ≡ u = N(z − f (s); 0, 1)). Here, a standard normal is assumed, where
the mean is 0, and the variance is 1.3 Analogously, noisy effectors can be modeled us-
ing actions with double the arguments: l(move(x, y), s) = u ≡ u = N(y − x; 0, 1). This
says the difference between actual distance moved and the intended amount is normally
distributed, corresponding to additive Gaussian noise. Such noise models can also be
made context dependent (e.g., specifying the sensor’s error profile to be worse for lower
temperatures, where the temperature value is situation-dependent). In the case of noisy
effectors, the successor state axioms have to be defined to use the second argument, as
this is what actually happens at a situation [15].
Analogous to the notion of knowledge, the degree of belief in φ in situation s is
defined as the weight of accessible worlds where φ is true:
Bel(φ, s) 
1
γ
∑
{s′:φ[s′]}
p(s′, s).
Here, γ is the normalization factor and corresponds to the numerator but with φ replaced
by true. The change in p values over actions is specified using a successor state axiom,
analogous to the one for K: p(s′, do(a, s)) = u ≡ ∃s′′ [s′ = do(a, s′′)∧Poss(a, s′′)∧ u =
p(s′′, s)×l(a, s′′)]∨ ¬∃s′′ [s′ = do(a, s′′)∧Poss(a, s′′)∧u = 0]. This axioms determines
how l affects the p-value of successor situations.
As the BHL model is defined as a sum over possible worlds, it cannot actually han-
dle Gaussians and other continuous distributions involving π, e, exponentiation, and so
on. Therefore, BHL always consider discrete probability distributions that approximate
the continuous ones. However, this limitation was lifted in [15], which shows how Bel
is defined in continuous domains.
4.2 Reasoning Problems
The projection problem in this setting is geared for reasoning about formulas that
now mention Bel. In particular, we might be interested in knowing whether D |=
Bel(φ, do(a¯, S0)) ≥ r for a real number r.
3 If the specification of the p-axiom or the l-axiom includes disjunctions and existential quanti-
fiers, we will then be dealing with uncertainty about distributions. See [14], for example.
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One reductive approach would be to translate both D and φ, which would mention
Bel, into a predicate logic formula. This approach, however, presents a serious com-
putational problem because belief formulas expand into a large number of sentences,
resulting in an enormous search space with initial and successor situations. The other
issue with this approach is that sums (and integrals in the continuous case) reduce to
complicated second-order formulas.
In [10], it is shown how Reiter’s regression operator can be generalized to operate
directly on Bel-terms. This involves appealing to the likelihood axioms. For example,
imagine a robot that is uncertain about its distance d to the wall, and the prior is a
uniform distribution on the interval [2, 12]. Assume the robot (noise-free) moves away
by 2 units and is now interested in the belief about d ≤ 5. Regression would tell the
robot that this is equivalent to its initial beliefs about d ≤ 3 which here would lead to
a value of .1. Imagine then the robot is also equipped with a sonar unit with additive
Gaussian noise. After moving away by 2 units, if the sonar were now to provide a
reading of 8, then regression would derive that belief about d ≤ 5 is equivalent to
1/γ×
∫ 3
2
.1×N(6−x; 0, 1) dx. Essentially, the posterior belief about d ≤ 5 is reformulated
as the product of the prior belief about d ≤ 3 and the likelihood of d ≤ 3 given an
observation of 6. That is, observing 8 after moving away by 2 units is equated here to
observing 6 initially. (Here, γ is the normalization factor.)
Progression too could potentially be addressed by expanding formulas involving
Bel-terms, but it is far from clear what precisely this would look like. In particular, given
initial beliefs about fluents (such as the one about d earlier), we intuit that a progression
account would inform us how this distribution changed. For example, on moving away
from the wall by 2 units, we would now expect d to be uniformly distributed on the
interval [4, 14]. However, this leads to a complication: because if the robot had instead
moved towards the wall by 4 units, then those points where d ∈ [2, 4] initially are
mapped to a single point d = 0 that should then obtain a probabilitymass of .2, while the
other points retain their initial density of .1. In [11], it is shown that for a certain class
of basic action theories called invertible theories, such complications are avoidable,
and moreover, the progressed database can be specified by means of simple syntactic
manipulations.
4.3 Closed vs Open Worlds
The closed vs open world discussion does not seem immediately interesting here, be-
cause, after all, the language is clearly open in the sense of not knowing the values of
fluents, and according a distribution to these values. However, consider that the closed-
world assumption was also motivated previously by computational concerns. In that re-
gard, the above regression and progression results already studied special cases involv-
ing conjugate distributions [18], such as Gaussians which admit attractive analytical
simplifications. For example, efficient Kalman filters [79] often make the assumption
that the initial prior and the noise models are Gaussians, in which case the posterior
would also be a Gaussian. In [12], it is further shown that when the initial belief is a
Bayesian network, by way of regression, projection can be handled effectively by sam-
pling. (That is, once the formula is regressed, the network is sampled and the samples
are evaluated against the regressed formula.)
Logic, Probability and Action: A Situation Calculus Perspective 9
In the context of probabilistic specifications, the notion of “open”-ness can perhaps
be interpreted differently. We can take this to mean that we do not know the distribu-
tion of the random variables, or even that the set of random variables is not known in
advance. As argued earlier, this is precisely the motivation for the BHL scheme, and a
recent modal reformulation of BHL illustrates the properties of such a language in de-
tail [7]. A detailed demonstration of how such specifications would work in the context
of robot localization was given in [14].
The question of how to effectively compute beliefs in such rich settings is not clear,
however. We remark that various static frameworks have emerged for handling impre-
cision or uncertainty in probabilistic specifications [66,24,58]. For example, when we
have finitely many random variables but there is uncertainty about the underlying dis-
tribution, credal representations are of interest [24], and under certain conditions, they
can be learned and reasoned with in an efficient manner [58]. On the other hand, when
we have infinitely many random variables (but with a single underlying distribution),
proposal such as [72] and [2] are of interest, the latter being a weighted representation
inspired by proper+ knowledge bases. Extending these to allow uncertainty about the
underlying distribution may also be possible. Despite being static, by means of regres-
sion or progression, perhaps such open knowledge bases can be exploited for cognitive
robotics applications, but that remains to be seen.
4.4 High-Level Control
A high-level programming language that deals with noise has to reason about two kinds
of complications. First, when a noisy physical or sensing action in the program is per-
formed, we must condition the next instruction on how the belief has changed as a result
of that action. Second, because sensing actions in the language are of the form sense(z)
that expects an input z, an offline executionwould simulate possible values for zwhereas
an online execution would expect an external source to provide z (e.g., reading off the
value of a sonar). We also would not want the designer to be needlessly encumbered
by the error profiles of the various effectors and sensors, so she has to be encouraged
to program around sense-act loops; that is, every action sequence should be accompa-
nied with a suitable number of sensing readings so that the agent is “confident” (i.e.,
the distribution of the fluent in question is narrow) before performing more actions. In
[13], such a desiderata was realized to yield a stochastic version of knowledge-based
programming [71]. Primitive instructions are dummy versions of noisy actions and sen-
sors; e.g., move(x,y) is simply move(x) and sonar(z) is simply sonar. The idea then is
that the modeler simply uses these dummy versions as she would with noise-free ac-
tions, but the execution semantics incorporates the change in belief. It is further shown
that program execution can be realized by means of a particle filtering [79] strategy:
weighted samples are drawn from the initial beliefs, which correspond to initial situa-
tions, and on performing actions, fluent values at these situations are updated by means
of the successor state axioms. The degree of belief in φ corresponds to summing up the
weights of samples where φ is true.
Such an approach can be contrasted with notable probabilistic relational modelling
proposals such as [68]: the difference mainly pertains to three sources of generality.
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First, a language like the situation calculus allows knowledge bases to be arbitrary quan-
tificational theories, and BHL further allows uncertainty about the distributions defined
for these theories. Second, the situation calculus, and by extension, GOLOG and the
paradigm in [13] allows us to reason about non-terminating and unbounded behavior
[23]. Third, since an explicit belief state is allowed, it becomes possible to provide a
systematic and generic treatment for multiple agents [44,6].
On the issue of tractable reasoning, an interesting observation is that because these
programs require reasoning with an explicit belief state [34], one might wonder whether
the programs can be “compiled” to a reactive plan, possibly with loops, where the next
action to be performed depends only on the sensing information received in the current
state. This relates knowledge-based programming to generalized planning [55,76], and
of course, the advantage is also that numerous strategies have been identified to syn-
thesize such loopy, reactive plans. Such plans are also shown to be sufficient for goal
achievability [59]; however, knowledge-based programs are known to be exponentially
more succinct than loopy, reactive plans [49]. In [42], a generic algorithmic framework
was proposed to synthesize such plans in noise-free environments. How the correctness
of such plans should be generalized to noisy environments was considered in [8,3]. The
algorithmic synthesis problem was then considered in [81].
5 Related Work and Discussions
There are many threads of research in AI, automated planning and robotics that are
close in spirit to what is reported here. For example, belief update via the incorporation
of sensor information has been considered in probabilistic formalisms such as Bayesian
networks [70,52], Kalman and particle filters [79]. But these have difficulties handling
strict uncertainty. Moreover, since rich models of actions are rarely incorporated, shift-
ing conditional dependencies and distributions are hard to address in a general way.
While there are graphical formalisms with an account of actions, such as [25,39], they
too have difficulties handling strict uncertainty and quantification. To the best of our
knowledge, no existing probabilistic formalism handles changes in state variables like
those possible in the BHL scheme. Related to these are relational probabilistic mod-
els [67,66,32,21]. Although limited accounts for dynamic domains are common here
[50,69], explicit actions are seldom addressed in a general way. We refer interested
readers to discussions in [15], where differences are also drawn to prior developments
in reasoning about actions, including stochastic but non-epistemic GOLOG dialects
[37].
Arguably, many of the linguistic restrictions of such frameworks is often motivated
by computational considerations. So what is to be gained by a general approach? This
question is especially significant when we take into account that numerous “hybrid”
approaches have emerged over the years that provide a bridge between a high-level
language and a low-level operation [19,51]. Our sense is that while these and other ap-
proaches are noteworthy, and are extended in a modular manner to keep things tractable
and workable on an actual physical robot, it still leaves a lot at the mercy of the roboti-
cist’s ingenuity. For example, extending an image recognition algorithm to reason about
a structured world is indeed possible, but it is more likely than not that this ontology is
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also useful for a number of other components, such as the robot’s grasping arm; more-
over, changes to one must mean changes to all. Abstracting a complex behavior module
of a robot is a painstaking effort: often the robot’s modules are written in different
programming languages with varying levels of abstraction, and to reduce these interac-
tions to atoms in the high-level language would require considerable know-how of the
system. Moreover, although a roboticist can abstract probabilistic sensors in terms of
high-level categorical ones, there is loss in detail, as it is not clear at the outset which
aspect of the sensor data is being approximated and by how much. Thus, all of these
“bottom-up” approaches ultimately challenge the claim that the underlying theory is a
genuine characterization of the agent.
In service of that, the contributions reported in this work attempt to express all the
(inner and outer) workings of a robot in a single mathematical language: a mathematical
language that can capture rich structure as well as natively reason about the probabilistic
uncertainty plaguing a robot; a mathematical language that can reason with all available
information, some of which may be probabilistic, and some categorical; a mathematical
language that can reason about the physical world at different levels of abstraction, in
terms of objects, atoms, and whatever else physicists determine best describes our view
of the world. Undoubtedly, given this glaring expressiveness, the agenda will raise sig-
nificant challenges for the applicability of the proposal in contemporary robots, but our
view is that, it will also engender novel extensions to existing algorithms to cope with
the expressiveness. Identifying tractable fragments, for example, will engender novel
theoretical work. As already discussed, many proposals from the statistical relational
learning community are very promising in this regard, and are making steady progress
towards the overall ambition. (But as discussed, they fall short in terms of being able
to reason about non-terminating behavior, arbitrary first-order quantification, among
other things, and so identifying richer fragments is a worthwhile direction.) It is also
worth remarking that the tractability of reasoning (and planning) has been the primary
focus of much of the research in knowledge representation. The broader question of
how to learn models has received lesser attention, and this is precisely where statistical
relational learning and related paradigms will prove useful [4]. (It would be especially
interesting to consider relational learning with neural modules [29].) Indeed, in addi-
tion to approaches such as [22,75], there have been a number of advances recently on
learning dynamic representations (e.g., [68]), which might provide fertile ground to
lift such ideas for cognitive robotics. Computability results for qualitative learning in
dynamic epistemic logic has been studied in [16]. Recently, proper+ knowledge bases
were shown to be polynomial-time learnable for querying tasks [5]. Ultimately, learn-
ing may provide a means to coherently arrive at action descriptions at different levels
of granularity from data [26]. In the long term, the science of building a robot, which
currently is more of an art, can perhaps be approached systematically. More signifi-
cantly, through the agenda of cognitive robotics, we might gain deep insights on how
commonsense knowledge and actions interact for general-purpose, open-ended robots.
In that regard, the integration of logic, probability and actions will play a key role.
12 V. Belle
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